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notwithstanding widespread recognition of the need for better tools for
responding to climate change, toxic chemicals, non-point source water
In addition, the Environmental
pollution, and other problems. 1
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has struggled in the wake of limited
resources and politicization to effectively use the tools it has, and its
rulemaking processes are often dominated by industry and other repeat
players. 2 To deal with the environmental challenges we face, we must
better account for the interests of the general public and harness the
insights and goodwill of those outside the conventional regulatory state.
This article proposes two mechanisms for doing so: (1) establishment of
regulatory contrarians within the EPA to serve as a voice for
underrepresented interests and future generations in agency proceedings;
and (2) government sanction of environmental certification systems to
facilitate more sustainable purchasing decisions.
I. CHALLENGES TO THE REGULATORY STATE
This Part highlights several of the most serious challenges
confronting the regulatory state today. Though these challenges are
common among regulatory agencies, they are particularly acute at the
EPA because of the complex and controversial subjects that the agency
addresses.
A.

Agency Ossification and Inaction

Regulatory agencies have been plagued by regulatory
ossification—the increasingly slow and burdensome nature of
rulemaking variously attributed to “hard look” judicial review as well as
procedural requirements imposed by Congress and the executive
branch. 3 Ossification fosters excessive caution and delay in issuing
rules, thereby frustrating statutory goals and discouraging policy
experimentation and adaptation.4 Ossification also drains agency
resources and pushes agencies to rely on informal policy statements

1. See Richard N.L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 223, 224-25, 254 (2011).
2. Id. at 253-56.
3. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 769-72 (2006); Stephen
M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38
ENVTL. L. 767, 774-78 (2008); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992).
4. McGarity, supra note 3, at 1392-93.
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rather than promulgated rules.5 In light of the scientifically taxing
mandates often imposed upon it, the EPA is especially vulnerable to
rulemaking delay and frustration as compared to other agencies.6
Complaints about EPA inaction and delay were frequent during the
George W. Bush Administration, but are not unique to that
administration. 7 Delay frequently characterizes revision of regulatory
standards as well as initial policy making, as the EPA often misses
statutory deadlines or fails to respond to new information or technology
changes. 8
The difficulty of contesting agency inaction compounds the
problem of ossification. Judicial review of agency action is generally
easier to obtain than judicial review of agency inaction.9 Regulatory
beneficiaries seeking to challenge inaction may not have standing to get
into court and, even if they can demonstrate standing, are able to
challenge only an agency’s failure to take discrete actions that are
mandated by law. 10 Legislative oversight and industry protests are also
more likely to focus on agency action than inaction. 11 Together, these

5. McGarity, supra note 3, at 1393-94; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75
TEX. L. REV. 483, 484-89 (1997).
6. Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
181, 262-63 (1999); James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act—Antiregulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions?, 12-SPG KS. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 521, 542-43 (2003) (citing comments by ABA
Section on Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice). The listing of hazardous air pollutants prior
to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and the regulation of toxic chemicals under TSCA are
leading examples of regulatory paralysis stemming at least in part from such overly burdensome
mandates. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1668 n.200 (1995); John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical
Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L. Q. 721, 766 (2008).
7. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1378 (2013) (discussing examples where EPA “has moved slowly, or
not at all on important risks”); Id. at 1389 (discussing EPA’s slow responses, or lack of responses,
to rulemaking petitions); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1384-85 (2011); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation:
The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 118-21
(1998).
8. Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1715-25 (2008).
9. Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 370 (2009).
10. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004); Staszewski, supra
note 9, at 376-77; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664-75 (2004) (discussing nonreviewability and
standing doctrines as barriers to review of agency inaction).
11. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629,
1646-47 (2011).
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“asymmetr[ies] create[] incentives for agencies to pay more attention to
the interests and perspectives of regulated entities—and to ignore the
views of regulatory beneficiaries—during the administrative process.” 12
B.

Imbalanced Rulemaking

Even when agencies are able to overcome the barriers and
disincentives to action, modern rulemaking departs substantially from
the perhaps unrealizable ideal in which stakeholders and the public work
together with agencies to develop rules that advance the social good in a
fair and democratically responsive way. 13 As predicted by public choice
theory, rulemaking on health and environmental matters tends to be
dominated by regulated entities, which have the most immediately at
stake. 14 Regulated entities face far stronger incentives than regulatory
beneficiaries to make the substantial investments in time, personnel, and
other resources required to participate in rulemaking. Also, regulated
entities often have greater control of information relevant to crafting
regulatory standards. 15 The flood of information that agencies face
further exacerbates the imbalance in favor of regulated entities, obscures
the issues, and increases the costs of participation.16 As Professor
Wendy Wagner has explained, environmental rulemakings that set
industry- or product-specific standards are particularly susceptible to the
problem of “information capture” because these proceedings necessarily
focus on technical documentation relating to alternative compliance
options and their cost burdens on industry. 17
Domination by regulated entities often begins before an agency
formally proposes a rule. In hopes of crafting rules that can withstand or
avoid legal challenge, agencies may communicate extensively with
regulated parties regarding their drafting. 18 The matters at hand are
often technical and complex, particularly where environmental
regulation is at issue. Proposals emerging from this process may be so
12. Staszewski, supra note 9, at 371.
13. This ideal reflects both a pluralist account of agency decision-making, in which the
agency decision is seen as considering and reflecting a variety of interests, and a civic republican
account, in which the agency decision is seen as the product of a democratically deliberative
process. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1350-51 (2011).
14. Id. at 1357-58.
15. Id. at 1357-58.
16. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Wagner, Administrative Law].
17. Id. at 1343-51.
18. Id. at 1380-81.
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complicated and voluminous that participation by individual members of
the public is difficult, if not impossible.19 Indeed, even with the ease of
electronically accessing information and transmitting comments, levels
of citizen participation in rulemaking remain low. 20 Individual citizens
may not realize the significance of agency rulemaking, and they
typically have little motivation to become involved in a time-consuming
process that promises negligible personal benefit.21 Environmental
nonprofits can play an important role in representing the interests of
regulatory beneficiaries, but their positions and interests may differ from
those of their members and the general public. 22 Moreover, given the
high cost of active participation in a rulemaking, nonprofits must
selectively deploy their limited resources towards issues that are likely to
yield the highest payoff in terms of positive publicity. 23
When individuals or public interest groups do participate in
rulemaking, effects on substantive outcomes are often difficult to
discern. The idealized model of notice-and-comment rulemaking
contemplates public input upon issuance of a proposed rule, followed by
a thoughtful discussion and response to concerns that are raised.
Standard rulemaking procedures, however, encourage commenters to
take “extreme positions” and to file “one-shot attempts at persuasion.” 24
As a result, comment processes often fail to promote a meaningful
conversation among commenters and agency officials. Indeed, by the
time a proposed rule is released, the agency often has already consulted
extensively with regulated parties and is unlikely to make significant
changes. 25 To the extent that changes are made, they tend to reflect
industry concerns rather than those of the general public.26 One
explanation for the one-sided nature of agency changes to proposed rules
is industry dominance of the comment process. For example, a study of
EPA hazardous air pollutant rulemakings found that industry
participated in more rulemaking proceedings than public interest groups
19. Id. at 1384-86; Mendelson, supra note 13, at 1357 (noting paucity of comments from
ordinary citizens in several studied rulemakings).
20. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
DUKE L.J. 943, 943 (2006).
21. Id. at 965-66.
22. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,
473 (2005).
23. Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1379, 1387.
24. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 947 (2009).
25. Id. at 931-32; Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1366.
26. Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1387-88.
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and filed far more comments in each proceeding. 27 In addition, as
Professor Nina Mendelson notes, “agencies appear to treat technically
and scientifically oriented comments far more seriously than . . . valueladen or policy-focused comments.” 28 Although the latter may be just as
relevant as the former to the rulemaking task, 29 agencies perceive valueladen comments as less likely to support a successful legal challenge.30
Lack of meaningful public participation in agency rulemaking is
problematic not only because participation itself is democratically
valuable, but also because public participation can provide relevant
information, inform decision makers of public values and preferences,
Together, agency
and confer legitimacy on agency actions.31
ossification, inaction, and imbalanced rulemaking processes create an
agency that fails to act as often as it should, and that is less effective
when it does act.
C.

The Limits of Regulation

Finally, the government’s struggles to address environmental
challenges suggest general limitations to the ability of conventional
regulation alone to adequately respond to these challenges. The “New
Governance” school of thought recognizes the growing significance of
non-state actors and diverse policy instruments to address public
problems alongside or in collaboration with government. 32 Broader
governance efforts, as exemplified by voluntary regulation and
environmental certification, can foster coordination, innovation, and
adaptation while tapping into the energy and resources of stakeholders,
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and the public.33 At the
same time, however, these governance mechanisms can raise serious
27. Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 128-29 (2011).
28. Mendelson, supra note 13, at 1359.
29. Id. at 1347.
30. Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1387-88.
31. Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions:
Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership with Experts and Agents, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 164-65 (2009); see also Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or
Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 321, 364-68 (2010).
32. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Lesley K. McAllister,
Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2012); Brad Karkkainen, “New
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous
Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474-75 (2004).
33. Lobel, supra note 32, at 345, 375.
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concerns regarding effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.
Finding ways to put these mechanisms to good use while attending to
such concerns is essential.
II. THE CASE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES
This Part proposes the establishment of new offices within the
EPA—“environmental advocates”—to serve two critical needs
suggested by the preceding discussion. One type of advocate would
represent statutory beneficiaries or underrepresented groups in
rulemaking processes. A second type of advocate would review the
EPA’s performance more generally and recommend new initiatives or
reforms to problematic processes and practices. While patterned after
traditional ombudsmen, these new offices would have a broader mission
and would not be limited to responding to specific complaints.
A.

The Traditional Ombudsman

As a government official whose function is to take positions
contrary to government agencies, the traditional ombudsman offers a
useful starting point for considering the design and role of the proposed
environmental advocates. Typically, an ombudsman is a public official
who receives and investigates complaints regarding the conduct of
government and makes recommendations for improving its operation.34
The concept originated in Sweden, whose justitieombudsman was
established by parliament to “‘supervise the observance of laws and
statutes’ as they may be applied ‘by the courts and by public officials
and employees.’” 35 The current justitieombudsman’s powers include the
right to make a formal note to parliament, conduct inspections, initiate
disciplinary actions, and publish criticisms and recommendations
regarding the operation of the government. 36
The ombudsman institution now found in many countries is tasked
primarily with receiving, investigating, and helping to resolve individual
citizens’ complaints regarding maladministration.37 The investigation of
34. Ian Harden, When Europeans Complain: The Work of the European Ombudsman, 3
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 199, 201 (2000-2001); Mary Seneviratne, Ombudsmen 2000,
9 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 13, 16 (2000).
35. WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN NINE
COUNTRIES 205 (1966) (quoting the Swedish constitution).
36. Thomas Bull, The Original Ombudsman: Blueprint in Need of Revision or a Concept
with More to Offer?, 6 EUR. PUB. L. 334, 336-37 (2000).
37. Seneviratne, supra note 34, at 16; Phillip Giddings, The Ombudsman as Advocate, 4 EUR.
Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 207, 207-09 (2004-2005).
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complaints by ombudsmen, moreover, can help bring systemic problems
to the attention of agency officials, legislators, and the public.38
Although ombudsmen in different systems vary in organization, power,
and methods, they share several common features: independence,
flexibility, and a lack of authority to impose a binding solution.39 This
last feature, lack of authority, forces the ombudsman to rely upon “the
power of report” to effectuate change. 40 Ultimately, the appeal of the
ombudsman institution stems from its flexibility, informality, and
relatively low cost, as compared with more formal means of dispute
resolution. 41
The United States has adopted the ombudsman concept slowly.
Elected officials have been reluctant to allow others to intrude on the
delivery of constituent services, and public employees have been wary
of additional supervision.42 Nonetheless, ombudsmen can be found
within federal, state, and local governments, as well as in quasi-public
and private institutions.43 Examples of federal ombudsmen include the
Taxpayer Advocate Service (“TAS”) of the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), which focuses on assisting taxpayers in disputes with the IRS,
and Food and Drug Administration ombudsmen, who handle disputes
from regulated industry regarding drug applications and the like.44
The TAS illustrates the potential benefits of an effective
ombudsman. The TAS consists of 2,000 caseworkers and data analysts
who are overseen by a national taxpayer advocate appointed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. The TAS’ central function is to assist in
resolving taxpayer complaints and to serve as a check on the
inquisitorial and highly automated system of tax administration.45
Although the TAS may, under appropriate circumstances, issue orders to
stay IRS enforcement against a complaining citizen, the TAS has
generally relied instead on less coercive means to resolve disputes. 46
38. Seneviratne, supra note 34, at 19.
39. Harden, supra note 34, at 201-02.
40. David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Federal Ombudsman: An Underused
Resource, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 275, 280 (1991).
41. Harden, supra note 34, at 201; Seneviratne, supra note 34, at 17.
42. Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 278.
43. Id. at 287.
44. See, e.g., OMBUDSMAN 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (FDA Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Research, Silver Spring, MD), at 4.
45. 26 U.S.C. § 7803(c) (West 2013) (establishing Office of the Taxpayer Advocate); Bryan
Camp, What Good Is the National Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAX NOTES 1243, 1249 (Mar. 8,
2010); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1655; Elizabeth Dwoskin, Defender of Last
Resort, BUS. WK., Apr. 9-15, 2012, at 68.
46. Camp, supra note 45, at 1252-54.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/8

8

Lin: Power to the People
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 7 LIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

9/19/2013 2:45 PM

1025

The TAS not only handles individual cases, but also promotes policy
reform by proposing administrative and legislative changes, issuing an
annual report to Congress, and disseminating its research widely. 47 As
described by one commentator, the TAS’ mission is “to continually
present the taxpayer point of view to other subcomponents within the
agency as a balance, counterweight, or check to insular thinking and the
enforcement mentality that often pervades inquisitorial systems.” 48
The EPA has had some limited experience with ombudsmen. The
1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) amendments
required EPA to establish a national Office of the Ombudsman to
receive complaints and requests for information with respect to EPA’s
hazardous waste program. 49 Although the position was statutorily
authorized for only four years, the EPA continued the office until 2002
as a matter of policy. The EPA even expanded the office’s scope to
include the Superfund program, and established regional ombudsmen as
well. 50 In its early years, the national ombudsman primarily provided
information and addressed concerns regarding the interpretation and
enforcement of hazardous waste regulations. 51 In later years, its focus
shifted to investigating malfeasance at Superfund cleanups.52 The
national ombudsman office was eliminated in 2002, however, apparently
as a result of conflict between the Office of the Ombudsman and the
EPA administrator. 53 The regional ombudsmen, which were renamed
“Regional Public Liaisons,” continue to be responsible today for
providing information and resolving complaints pertaining to the
Superfund and hazardous waste programs, but their efficacy has come
into question. 54 In addition to the regional ombudsmen, an EPA small
47. 26 U.S.C. § 7803(c)(2); Camp, supra note 45, at 1254.
48. Camp, supra note 45, at 1249.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6917.
50. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), EPA’S NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OMBUDSMEN
DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INDEPENDENCE 1 (2001) [hereinafter GAO].
51. Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 319-20; see generally OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN,
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE OMBUDSMAN
HANDBOOK (1987).
52. Whistleblower Seeks Restoration of Independent EPA Ombudsman, ENVIRONMENTAL
NEWS
SERVICE,
Jan.
8,
2008,
available
at
http://ens-newswire.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/05/2008-01-08-0951.html.
53. See id.
54. EPA, REGIONAL PUBLIC LIAISON PROGRAM GUIDANCE, OSWER 9200.1-106 (May
2011) (describing duties of liaison); EPA, FY 2010 REGIONAL PUBLIC LIAISON ANNUAL REPORT,
OSWER 9200.0-79 (2011) (reporting that two of ten liaison positions were vacant and that liaisons
handled less than a dozen cases, including information requests); EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, REGIONAL PUBLIC LIAISON PROGRAM NEEDS GREATER FOCUS ON RESULTS AND
CUSTOMER AWARENESS 6-7 (2009) (observing that implementation of liaison functions “is a
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business ombudsman serves as a liaison in disputes between the EPA
and small businesses, provides technical assistance to small businesses,
and advocates for small business in EPA rulemakings. 55
The EPA’s national ombudsman office was criticized in a
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report for failing to satisfy
professional standards that might have ensured its independence and
impartiality. Specifically, the national ombudsman was located within
the organizational unit that it was responsible for investigating, and the
ombudsman was subject to that unit’s budget, staffing, and supervisory
decisions. 56 The national ombudsman also did not issue an annual report
that might have fostered accountability. 57 The GAO report found EPA’s
regional ombudsmen to be even less independent and effective, as
employees assigned to the position divided time between their program
function of implementing hazardous waste programs and their
ombudsman function of investigating those same programs. 58
B.

A Broader Role for Agency Outsiders: Regulatory Contrarians

The TAS and EPA ombudsmen are traditional ombudsmen focused
on receiving and resolving complaints by regulated parties. This model
of a reactive ombudsman assumes that complainants require relief from
a heavy-handed or unresponsive bureaucracy. 59 However, there are
broader functions and roles that ombudsmen-like officials can undertake.
Professors Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz have coined the term
“regulatory contrarians” to generally describe entities that are “affiliated
with, but independent of, a . . . [regulator and that have] the task of
monitoring the regulator and the regulated marketplace and publicly
suggesting new initiatives or potential structural or personnel
Regulatory contrarians include not only traditional
changes.” 60
ombudsmen, but also: (1) “consumer representative contrarians” or
“proxy advocates,” whose primary function is to represent consumers or
the public as a class, rather than to handle individual complaints; and (2)
“research contrarians,” who have the autonomy to produce independent

collateral duty for most [liaisons]”). EPA generally assigns employees to these positions to serve on
a part-time basis. GAO, supra note 50, at 16.
55. Asbestos and Small Business Ombudsman, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/sbo/ (last updated
May 16, 2012).
56. GAO, supra note 50, at 2-3, 7-9.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Cf. HAZARDOUS WASTE OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 1-1.
60. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1632-33.
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research specifically aimed at identifying new problems for the agency
to address. 61
1. Proxy Advocates
A common example of a proxy advocate is the Offices of Public
Counsel established by many states in affiliation with their public utility
regulators. 62 The California Division of Ratepayer Advocates (“DRA”),
for example, is charged with representing the interests of public utility
customers before the California Public Utilities Commission and other
forums in proceedings that affect the rates, reliability, and quality of
utility services.63 The DRA’s objective is “to obtain the lowest possible
rate for service consistent with reliable and safe service levels,”64 and
the DRA files pleadings in a range of formal and informal proceedings,
including applications to raise rates, investigations, rulemakings, and
complaints. 65 At the federal level, the recent financial crisis led to the
inclusion of similar proxy advocate mechanisms in the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Act. These mechanisms include a Consumer Advisory Board, a body
composed of consumer interest advocates that advise and consult with
the regulatory agency (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) to
protect consumers. In addition there is an Investor Advisory Committee,
which advises and consults with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on protecting investor interests.66 These advisory bodies
are required to meet at least twice per year and are located within the
agencies they advise. 67
Proxy advocates are intended as a corrective to public choice
dynamics by advocating on behalf of consumers or other diffuse groups
who cannot adequately represent themselves before administrative
61. Id. at 1657, 1664-65; Darryl G. Stein, Perilous Proxies: Issues of Scale for Consumer
Representation in Agency Proceedings, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 513, 515-17 (2012).
McDonnell and Schwarcz also identify a fourth category of regulatory contrarian: inspectors general
and other investigative contrarians. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1661-64.
62. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1657-58; Stein, supra note 61, at 520-24.
63. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 309.5 (2006) (establishing office within Public Utilities
Commission, with director to be appointed by the Governor, subject to Senate confirmation); DRA
2011 ANNUAL REPORT (California Public Utilities Comm.), 2012, at 9.
64. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 309.5(a).
65. DRA 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 9-11.
66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note
11, at 1673. In addition, prior to the elimination of the agencies in which they operated, proxy
advocates once represented consumer interests before the Civil Aeronautics Board and Interstate
Commerce Commission. Stein, supra note 61, at 527-32.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78pp; 12 U.S.C. § 5494; McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1673.
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agencies, particularly in ratemaking proceedings. 68 Such groups are
generally “less able to organize, less able to participate in technical
agency proceedings, and less likely to be heard by agency decision
makers.” 69 Historically, the need for proxy advocates was commonly
recognized in the context of public utility regulation, where competition
was often unavailable as a means of protecting consumers, and where
the disparity between the participatory capacities of regulated entities
and other interests tended to be especially large. 70 Proxy advocates
typically are tasked with addressing matters that directly implicate
consumer welfare and that are already the subject of agency
proceedings. 71
The institution of the proxy advocate must be carefully designed if
it is to fulfill its intended function. Like the agencies before which they
appear, proxy advocates are dependent on public support and vulnerable
to industry capture. 72 Moreover, proxy advocates who represent broad
constituencies may have to contend with conflicting obligations and
competing constituencies, and in the process may fail to represent those
groups most needing proxy representation. 73
2. Research Contrarians
In addition to acting as advocates for underrepresented interests in
agency proceedings, regulatory contrarians also may act as research
contrarians, seeking to improve agency performance more broadly. The
Dodd-Frank Act creates a number of offices relating to financial reform
that might be described as research contrarians. For example, the Office
of Financial Research is responsible for collecting data, identifying
potential sources of systemic financial risk, and bringing its analyses to
the attention of Congress and the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
a newly created council of agency heads that must meet regularly to
consider inadequacies of existing regulation.74 Another office, the
Federal Insurance Office, is responsible for monitoring the insurance
industry and “identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that
could contribute to a systemic crisis.” 75 As these examples suggest,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Stein, supra note 61, at 515; McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1658.
Stein, supra note 61, at 533.
Id. at 522-23.
McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1658, 1660.
Stein, supra note 61, at 546.
Id. at 548-49.
McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1670, 1674-75.
31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(A) (West 2013); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1671.
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research contrarians have the leeway to investigate incipient problems
and recommend administrative or legislative responses to those
problems.
C.

Proposal: A Public Advocate and a Reform Advocate at the EPA

What sort of regulatory contrarians would improve the EPA’s
effectiveness and representativeness? As discussed in Part I, rulemaking
processes suffer from a large disparity in participation and influence as
between regulated entities and the public. This fact suggests the
potential value of a proxy advocate who can represent the interests of the
general public and counter the influence of regulated entities before and
after a rule is proposed. For example, such an official, whom we might
call a “public advocate,” could raise concerns about overlooked public
health benefits and submit comments and data for the agency (and any
reviewing courts) to consider. 76 The proxy advocate might also choose
to participate in proceedings other than rulemakings, such as permitting
decisions, though its efforts should generally focus on agency action
having the greatest scope and effect.
Underrepresentation is not the only need that a regulatory
contrarian could address. The breakdown of the rulemaking process
means that the EPA is not undertaking initiatives—whether in the form
of rulemaking, rule enforcement, or otherwise—that it has the authority
to undertake. In addition, the pace of technological and societal change,
combined with the dynamic threat of climate change, suggests the utility
of an early warning function that would alert the EPA and the public to
emerging environmental threats or developments. 77 In short, there is a
need for an official who could carry out the functions of a research
contrarian, whom we might term a “reform advocate.” An EPA reform
advocate would have broad discretion to study issues relevant to the
EPA’s regulatory functions, including but not limited to problems with
existing regulatory processes. 78
A number of institutional design issues should be considered with
respect to designing the proposed EPA advocate offices. Independence
and persuasive authority will be critical for any contrarian, whether a

76. Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1414-15.
77. Cf. David Rejeski, The Molecular Economy, 27 ENVTL. FORUM 1, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 4041 (proposing “establishment of a high-level Early Warning Officer”); McDonnell & Schwarcz,
supra note 11, at 1635 (contending that contrarian institutions “can improve the capacity of
regulators to adapt to changing market conditions and structures”).
78. Cf. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1664-67 (discussing research contrarians).
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research contrarian or proxy advocate.79 Ultimately, the offices should
be designed to promote the essential characteristics of independence,
credibility, and representation.
1. Independence
An effective contrarian must be independent of the EPA, willing to
publicize the agency’s failings and take positions contrary to EPA
officials and staff. The ombudsman literature suggests several factors
that can affect the office’s independence, including qualifications,
method of appointment, funding, and placement. 80
Requiring that the proposed EPA advocates have a minimum
amount of expertise and other qualifications can reduce the risk that the
advocates will be overly political. 81 At the same time, the positions
should not be defined so narrowly as to eliminate candidates who would
bring an outsider perspective to the office. The TAS’ national taxpayer
advocate, for example, must have “a background in customer service as
well as tax law” and “experience in representing taxpayers,” but cannot
have worked for the IRS for two years prior to appointment. 82 Similarly,
the EPA advocates should be required to have a background in
environmental advocacy and environmental law or policy and should be
made subject to similar employment restrictions.
For many state-level public utility proxy advocates, appointment by
the executive or a lower-level executive official is common. 83
Regulatory contrarians can also be appointed by the legislature or by a
commission.
Appointment of the EPA advocates by the EPA
administrator would be far from ideal; such advocates may be reluctant
to criticize the administrator or the EPA. One advantage of such an
arrangement, however, is that it could be set up administratively and
would require no congressional action.84 It thus may offer the most
realistic option for establishing some sort of contrarian at the EPA in the
present political climate. Greater independence for the EPA advocates
might be provided through presidential or other high-level appointment,
79. Id. at 1645-46.
80. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1679-80; Anderson & Stockton, supra note
40, at 335-41; Stein, supra note 61, at 551-58.
81. Stein, supra note 61, at 553.
82. 26 U.S.C. § 7803(c)(1) (West 2013). The advocate is also prohibited from working for
the IRS for at least five years after leaving the office. Id.
83. Stein, supra note 61, at 556.
84. Cf. Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 335 (noting in 1991 that most federal
ombudsmen were created by agency order). An administratively created advocate could also be
administratively eliminated, of course.
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as suggested by the national taxpayer advocate’s appointment by the
Secretary of the Treasury. Such an arrangement would not necessarily
guarantee independence, however, as the advocates and the EPA
administrator, having been appointed by the same person, could well
share similar views. 85 Establishment and appointment of the advocates
by the legislature (or one of its subcommittees), would be consistent
with the traditional ombudsman model and more likely to promote
independence. 86 However, too great a level of independence may limit
the advocates’ ability to persuade the EPA. Perhaps a hybrid approach
would be preferable, in which the president appoints each advocate from
a list of candidates approved by a congressional committee, or in which
a congressional committee selects candidates identified by the president.
Alternatively, a non-legislative commission composed of public officials
and private citizens could identify qualified candidates for presidential
selection. These latter options all separate the functions of nomination
and appointment and thus would tend to promote a neutral selection
process. 87
Funding to ensure independent advocates presents another difficult
question of institutional design. On the one hand, funding through the
EPA would leave the advocates subject to EPA control, as experience
with the EPA’s RCRA ombudsman demonstrates. 88 Direct budget
appropriations from the legislature would offer independence from the
EPA, but would also subject the advocates to annual budgetary battles.
Independent advocates are not likely to have strong defenders in the
budgeting process, and consequently would be vulnerable to
underfunding or elimination. Ideally, the advocates would be supported
by a dedicated and distinct source of funding, which would promote
their independence. State proxy advocates are often supported through
fee levies on regulated entities, and a similar levy could be used to
support the EPA advocates.
The placement of regulatory contrarians within the bureaucracy
also affects their independence. As noted earlier, the independence of
EPA’s national ombudsman was compromised by its placement within
the organization it was responsible for investigating. At the state level,
85. Cf. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1658 (discussing Texas Office of Public
Insurance Counsel, who is appointed by governor).
86. William B. Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman, in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT? 37, 46-48 (Stanley V. Anderson, ed., 1968).
87. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, UNIV. OF CALIF., BERKELEY, ESTABLISHING
OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (Stanley V. Anderson &
John E. Moore eds., 1972).
88. Stein, supra note 61, at 557 (equating budgetary authority with overall control).
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proxy advocates can be found in various locations within the executive
branch: within the regulatory agency, but in a different division; within
the attorney general’s office or an agency other than the one it is charged
with investigating; or as a freestanding agency. 89 Placement outside the
agency generally promotes independence, but also creates a distance that
can foster distrust and undermine the contrarian’s effectiveness.90 A
balance between these competing interests might be struck by
establishing the advocates as a separate division within the EPA, distinct
from the programmatic offices whose work they will be evaluating. 91
Such an arrangement would foster some degree of independence, while
encouraging information sharing and relationships that can bring about
beneficial reforms.
2. Persuasive Authority
Lacking the authority to compel an agency to adopt a particular
course of action, regulatory contrarians must instead rely on their ability
to persuade. 92 A contrarian’s persuasive authority derives from its
credibility as well as its capacity to attract the attention of agency
officials and influential forces outside the agency. To be credible, a
contrarian must be respected and well-qualified.
Ideally, the
appointment process would produce such contrarians. The selection of a
respected contrarian is especially critical when the office of the
advocate—and its reputation—is initially being established.93
Moreover, a contrarian’s arguments must be well-informed.
Accordingly, the EPA advocates should have access to the information,
practices, and culture of the agency and relevant environmental
problems. 94 Each advocate will have to rely heavily on the EPA’s
expertise and information-gathering ability, but should also have a
modest expert staff of its own that can reassess and supplement the
EPA’s work. The separate staff, along with the advocate’s outsider
89. Id. at 554-55.
90. Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 339. With respect to the TAS, for example, staff
once rotated between functions as TAS and IRS employees. The clear separation of the two
organizations subsequently mandated by Congress has eliminated the opportunity for IRS
employees to experience and incorporate a more taxpayer-friendly view and “expanded potential for
mutual distrust.” Camp, supra note 45, at 1250.
91. EPA’s programmatic offices include the Office of Air and Radiation, Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, and Office of Water.
See About EPA, EPA
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
92. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1652.
93. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 87, at 11, 14.
94. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1648.
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status, will promote an independent perspective that will contribute to
the advocate’s persuasive power, particularly outside the agency.
Finally, the advocates can persuade by bringing outside pressure on the
agency to consider their arguments and to respond to their concerns.
Giving the EPA advocates access to the EPA administrator, White
House officials, legislators, and media, along with the authority to speak
publicly and issue public reports, will be essential to their
empowerment. 95
3. Representation
The purpose of having a proxy advocate would be to ensure
representation in agency processes for those requiring it most. Similarly,
a research contrarian’s function would be to give voice to unarticulated
views. But who are those most needing such representation? One
candidate is nature, whose interest is often defended by environmental
groups, but which of course cannot speak for itself. Similarly, future
generations would benefit from an official representative to articulate
their interests. In either instance, however, the political viability of such
an advocate would be doubtful because there would exist no direct
constituency to defend its work. A more politically feasible possibility
would be for the EPA advocates to represent the general public. The
general public may present too broad a class to be effectively
represented by a single advocate, however, due to its multiple and
potentially conflicting interests. Defining the potential group to be
represented too broadly can confuse a proxy advocate’s objective and
leave diffuse interests at a disadvantage. 96
There are several options for narrowing the interests that the
advocates are to represent. One possibility would be to identify
subpopulations that are systematically underrepresented in the political
process and agency proceedings, and to assign an advocate to
specifically represent those subpopulations. For example, an advocate
might be tasked with representing vulnerable populations or raising
environmental justice concerns. 97 This approach has the advantage of
being fairly straightforward, and it would be relatively easy to determine
if the advocate strays from its defined mission. Another possibility
would be to define an advocate’s role in rulemaking proceedings by
95. Id. at 1645.
96. Stein, supra note 61, at 549.
97. Cf. Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1414-15 (suggesting appointment of
advocates to scrutinize rulemakings on behalf of missing interests).
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looking first to the provisions on which a proposed rule is based to
identify a statute’s intended beneficiaries, and then comparing those
beneficiaries with rulemaking participants to identify those interests
needing representation. For example, in a proceeding to revise ambient
air quality standards under Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, the
advocate’s job would be to ensure adequate representation of public
health and welfare interests throughout the process. While such a
mechanism would tailor representation to particular proceedings, it
could be somewhat cumbersome to administer and would involve a
significant amount of discretion. Moreover, outside of rulemakings—as
in the case of the reform advocate—the advocate’s role is less subject to
easy definition. A final option would be to have the EPA advocates
accept suggestions from the public or from a diverse committee
regarding matters meriting further attention, and to allow the advocates
broad discretion in deciding where additional representation is needed.98
Excessively broad discretion would be vulnerable to abuse, however,
and would leave the advocates especially at risk of capture by regulated
interests.
III. THE CASE FOR A PUBLIC ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION
Neither a more vigorous EPA nor vigorous advocacy by regulatory
contrarians within the EPA will be enough to address our environmental
challenges. Government resources and public support for traditional
forms of oversight are limited. In addition, such oversight may not be
politically or practically feasible for regulating the individual behaviors
that are contributing significantly to environmental problems ranging
from biodiversity loss to climate change. 99 Efforts to protect the
environment must embrace collaborative and multi-party governance. 100

98. Use of an advisory committee would be comparable to the Investor Advisory Committee
created by Dodd-Frank, which includes an Investor Advocate (an official with ombudsman duties
comparable to the Taxpayer Advocate), as well as representatives of state governments, senior
citizens, and individual and institutional investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78pp(b); McDonnell & Schwarcz,
supra note 11, at 1673.
99. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm
Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005); JASON J. CZARNESKI,
EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE, AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (2010); J.B. Ruhl,
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL.
L. 363, 423-25 (2010).
100. Ruhl, supra note 99, at 425; see generally Lobel, supra note 32, at 371-404.
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The Promise of Environmental Certification

One important multi-party governance tool for influencing
individual behaviors is environmental certification, the use of which has
risen dramatically in recent years.101
Companies and nonprofit
organizations issue hundreds of environmental labels worldwide,
covering food, forest products, and numerous other items. 102 In the
United States, companies desiring to label the carbon content of their
products can choose from more than ten voluntary certification
programs. 103 The growing popularity of environmental certification
reflects the fact that many consumers deem a product’s environmental
attributes to be relevant to their purchasing decisions.104 In addition, the
development of voluntary certification programs has enabled public and
private actors to adopt procurement and permitting policies that favor
more sustainable goods and services. 105 Ultimately, well-designed
environmental certification processes can encourage environmentally
beneficial product substitution, improve production practices, and
promote green innovation. 106
Voluntary environmental certification programs are unlikely to
influence the operations of environmental laggards and cannot substitute
for traditional government regulation.107 Moreover, the broader effects
of these programs in promoting sustainability can be difficult to
measure. 108 But like regulatory contrarians, environmental certification
schemes can complement traditional regulation, shift “power to the
people,” and help to achieve outcomes that better reflect the public
interest.
The mechanisms by which regulatory contrarians and

101.
102.

TERRACHOICE, THE SINS OF GREENWASHING: HOME AND FAMILY EDITION 2010 (2010).
STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS AND
CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION ES-4
(2012); Juliet Eilperin, Environmental Certification Becoming Increasingly Crowded and Contested
Field, WASH. POST, May 3, 2010, at A4.
103. Jessica E. Fliegelman, The Next Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer
Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1045 (2010).
104. WORLD RESOURCES INST., 2010 GLOBAL ECOLABEL MONITOR: TOWARDS
TRANSPARENCY 3 (2010); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, Time to Try
Carbon Labelling, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 5 (2011).
105. TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 102, at ES-9.
106. Vandenbergh, Dietz & Stern, supra note 104, at 4-5; TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 102, at ES-6.
107. TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 102, at ES-14.
108. Id. at ES-6 (noting paucity of empirical evidence on whether certification drives largescale changes in favor of sustainability); Ralph E. Horne, Limits to Labels: The Role of Eco-Labels
in the Assessment of Product Sustainability and Routes to Sustainable Consumption, 33 INT’L J.
CONSUMER STUD. 175, 179-80 (2009).
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environmental certification systems operate are very different, of course.
Regulatory contrarians are proxies that stand for the interests of
underrepresented groups in regulatory proceedings.
In contrast,
environmental certification empowers consumers to express their
preferences about production processes and environmental practices
directly through market transactions.109 While it would be erroneous to
equate the preferences expressed in such transactions with choices made
through democratic political processes, marketplace decisions
undoubtedly have environmental impacts.
B.

Private Certification

The private sector dominates environmental certification in the
United States. Private certification allows the market to respond to
consumer demand for green products. In addition, competing labels
presumably can offer producers a range of certification options of
varying stringency. Although certifiers conceivably could reach a
consensus regarding appropriate criteria for certification, the
proliferation of environmental certification schemes—and the varying
standards the schemes apply—suggest a lack of consensus. 110 The sheer
number of certifications engenders consumer confusion regarding the
meaning and significance of eco-labels. 111 Exacerbating this confusion,
the source of a label is often unclear because certification-like labels can
be obtained with little or no testing by merely paying a fee. 112
Confusion diminishes the information value of labeling and contributes
to overall consumer skepticism towards environmental marketing
claims. 113 To the extent consumers are unable to distinguish between
certifications, consumer confusion reduces the attractiveness of more
109. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 624 (2004) (“process preferences instead
offer an important vehicle through which individuals influence the world, express their views on
public issues, and fashion their moral identity”).
110. Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1045-46 (discussing private environmental certification).
111. Norm Borin et al., Consumer Effects of Environmental Impact in Product Labeling, 28 J.
CONSUMER MARKETING 76, 76 (2011); NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE
UNIVERSITY, AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE 10 (Jay S. Golden, ed., Oct. 2010) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND
SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS].
112. Rick Harbaugh, John Maxwell & Beatrice Roussillon, Label Confusion: The Groucho
Effect of Uncertain Standards, 57 MANAGEMENT SCI. 1512, 1513 (2011); It’s Too Easy Being
Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. 2, 22 (2009) (statement of Hon. Bobby L.
Rush, a representative in congress from the state of Illinois).
113. Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 1513.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/8

20

Lin: Power to the People
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 7 LIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

9/19/2013 2:45 PM

1037

rigorous labeling schemes and creates incentives for certification
organizations to water down their standards. 114 Competing businesses
and certification systems sometimes do draw attention to the weaknesses
of certifications used or developed by rivals.115 Similarly, NGOs may
try to sort through the confusion on consumers’ behalf or pressure
Nonetheless,
businesses to use more stringent certifications.116
consumers are confronted with a bewildering array of eco-labels.
Credibility, transparency, and accountability concerns also surround
private certification systems. 117 Consumers generally cannot determine
directly whether a product was produced in an environmentally friendly
manner and must rely on certifiers to monitor environmental attributes
for them. 118 Therefore, credibility is essential to the success of
If a certification is not credible,
environmental certification. 119
consumers will not be willing to pay a premium for certified products.
The credibility of many environmental certifications is subject to doubt,
however, not only because of consumer confusion, but also because
producers typically pay for third-party certification. 120 In the absence of
truly independent certifiers or independent oversight of certification
systems, consumers have good reason to be skeptical.
Transparency can be a powerful means of bolstering credibility and
countering pressures to weaken certification criteria.121 Consumers or
other third parties with access to information on certifiers’ finances,
evaluation criteria, and monitoring processes, can assess the credibility
of certification schemes for themselves.
Unfortunately, many
certification schemes suffer from a lack of transparency. For example,
one study found over half of eco-labeling organizations “unreachable,
difficult to reach, or uncooperative when asked about core metrics.”122
114. Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10
YALE J. REG. 147, 213 (1993).
115. Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case
of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 80 (2006) [hereinafter Meidinger, Administrative Law].
116. Id. at 77.
117. McAllister, supra note 32, at 5.
118. John M. Crespi & Stephan Marette, Eco-Labelling Economics: Is Public Involvement
Necessary?, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 93, 96-97 (Signe Krarup
& Clifford S. Russell, eds., 2005).
119. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 211.
120. Id. at 209-10; Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 284 (2002-03) [hereinafter Meidinger, New Environmental Law]
(suggesting that certifiers “are in effect public fiduciaries employed by the very private actors
whose activities they are supposed to assess and monitor”).
121. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 213; Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at
1513.
122. WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note 104, at 14.
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Information on certification inspections tends to be especially sparse,
shrouded in concerns that confidential business information might be
revealed. 123
Transparency, moreover, is a critical element of accountability and
legitimacy. 124 These qualities matter because certification schemes can
influence formal legal mandates and serve as a form of regulation.125
Namely, these schemes set standards, determine compliance with those
standards, and sanction noncompliance. 126 As a form of governance,
certification systems have a responsibility to society at large and to
affected interests. Ultimately, private certification systems vary in the
extent to which they engage industry members, governments, NGOs,
and consumers. 127 Yet in contrast to government regulators, certifiers
are not accountable—directly or indirectly—to the electorate.
C.

The Government and Environmental Certification
1. Present Involvement

The federal government presently provides environmental
certifications in limited areas.128 Perhaps most familiar is the Energy
Star program, under which the EPA offers an “Energy Star” designation
for appliances, office equipment, new residential buildings, and various
other products meeting specified energy efficiency standards.129
Similarly, the EPA’s Water Sense designation recognizes water-using
products meeting EPA-determined efficiency and performance
criteria. 130 For both programs, participation is voluntary, specifications
are developed with stakeholder input and public comment, and an
123. Meidinger, Administrative Law, supra note 115, at 81.
124. Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law:
Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,162, 10,164 (2001) [hereinafter Meidinger,
Environmental Certification] (characterizing public access to information as “the most important
mechanism for protecting the legitimacy of government regulatory agencies in the modern era”).
125. Meidinger, supra note 124, at 10,165-66, 10,176 (“certification programs perform public
functions”).
126. Forest certification, for example, has been described as “a transnational, rule-oriented
system made up of competing, mutually adjusting organizations and institutions.” Meidinger,
Administrative Law, supra note 115, at 60.
127. TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 102, at ES-13; Meidinger, Administrative Law,
supra note 115, at 82-83.
128. See Mary Ann Mullin & Daniel J. Deeb, Policing of Green Claims, NAT. RES. & ENV’T,
Spring 2012, at 28, 29.
129. McAllister, supra note 32, at 18-19.
130. Water Sense: General Questions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/general.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2012).
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independent third party certifies products. 131 Importantly, both programs
are product-based schemes that focus narrowly on one environmental
impact from use—i.e., energy consumption in the case of Energy Star,
and water consumption in the case of Water Sense—rather than on
overall environmental impacts over the life cycle of a product.132
Beyond such programs, government involvement is largely limited
to Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) policing of the market for
deceptive practices. Since 1992, FTC guidelines, known as the Green
Guides, have assisted marketers in avoiding misleading environmental
marketing claims by suggesting practices that qualify for safe harbors
against prosecution. 133 The Green Guides have focused primarily on the
use of specific language regarding the environmental characteristics of a
product or production process. 134 However, the Green Guides do not
constitute binding rules. In addition, the FTC has brought relatively few
enforcement actions against green washing, and it has expressed a
reluctance to engage in setting environmental standards. 135
The FTC’s recent revisions to the Green Guides for the first time
specifically address claims relating to environmental certifications.136
The revisions state that a third-party certification may constitute an
endorsement, and as such, must reflect the endorser’s honest opinion. 137
They also recommend that certifications be accompanied by clear
language explaining the specific environmental benefits that have been
substantiated. 138 In addition, marketers who rely on third-party
certification must ensure that the certification adequately substantiates
the marketer’s claims. 139 Notably, in revising the Green Guides, the
FTC did not propose the establishment of a particular certification
system, or even guidance on the development of third-party certification
programs. Thus, while the revisions may curb the making of

131. Id.; EPA, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER CLIMATE PROTECTION PARTNERSHIPS: 2010
ANNUAL REPORT (2011). EPA implemented third-party certification for the Energy Star program
beginning in 2011. Id. at 17.
132. Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers Toward
Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. 1327, 1353 (2010).
133. Federal Trade Commission, Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77
FED. REG. 62,122 (2012); Minneti, supra note 132, at 1345-46.
134. See generally 16 C.F.R. § Part 260.
135. Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1042-43; Richard Dahl, Greenwashing: Do You Know
What You’re Buying?, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A246, A248 (2010).
136. Federal Trade Commission, Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77
FED. REG. 62,122 (2012).
137. Id. at 62,126-27 (setting out 16 C.F.R. § 260.6).
138. Id.
139. Id. (setting out 16 C.F.R. § 260.6(c)).
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unsubstantiated claims, they are unlikely to reduce consumer confusion
or ensure real environmental benefits.140
2. Potential Benefits of Further Involvement
Greater government involvement in environmental certification can
address many of the concerns that surround private certification.141 Such
involvement might simply take the form of stepped-up policing of
private certification programs. Alternatively, the government might
directly set standards, certify that processes and products meet those
standards, accredit certifiers, or select a board of directors to operate a
certification program. 142 Although stepped-up policing of private
certifiers may discourage green washing and increase transparency,
more direct government participation will likely be necessary to reduce
consumer confusion effectively. Accreditation of private certification
systems can reduce credibility concerns by ensuring that certifiers are
independent of the companies whose products are being certified. In a
market where multiple standards are overwhelming consumers,
government sanction can create a “focal” standard having clearly
defined requirements that would restore much of the information value
of labeling. 143 The Energy Star program provides one illustration of a
government standard that has attracted considerable participation from
major manufacturers, while gaining broad public recognition and
confidence. 144 Indeed, a focal standard may be valuable even if
consumers are not aware of the precise criteria underlying it. Consumers
may come to expect that the standard be met, and they may draw

140. Cf. Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized
Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 870-71 (2009)
(characterizing role of FTC Green Guides as no more than “supplemental” in policing carbon
offsets).
141. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 206.
142. Meidinger, Administrative Law, supra note 115, at 60 (discussing components of
certification systems); Grodsky, supra note 114, at 207-08 (sketching out hybrid model of
certification).
143. Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 1520; Crespi & Marette, supra note
118, at 101.
144. OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS, supra note 111, at 34.
In response to a 2010 Government Accountability Office investigation that sharply criticized
Energy Star’s reliance on self-certification, the government instituted a requirement that products
seeking certification be tested in approved, independent labs. Sonja Ryst, U.S. Agencies Try to
Restore Faith in Energy Star Appliance Testing, WASH. POST, July 10, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806804.html.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM: COVERT TESTING SHOWS THE
ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS VULNERABLE TO FRAUD AND ABUSE (2010).
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negative inferences about products that only obtain alternative
certifications. 145
Government involvement also can alleviate other difficulties
associated with purely private certification. A government-run program
can provide greater accountability because it would be subject to public
disclosure requirements and ultimately responsible to the public.146
Government certification programs also tend to incorporate concerns of
a wider range of stakeholders.147 Finally, government support can foster
financial stability and long-term viability. 148 An examination of
certification programs worldwide found those with significant
government involvement to have generally higher levels of market
penetration. 149
The U.S. organic food labeling program and Germany’s Blue Angel
environmental certification scheme illustrate the potential benefits of
government involvement in certification.
U.S. Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) implementation of national standards for organic
food has spurred dramatic growth in the organic market and led to
widespread acceptance of the organic label.150 Central to the program’s
success has been the reduction of consumer confusion regarding the
meaning of the term “organic,” which had been plagued with misleading
claims prior to creation of the government program. 151 Although the
program has been criticized for ignoring the organic movement’s vision
of small-scale production, humane practices, and environmental
stewardship, 152 the program undoubtedly has achieved its aims of
reducing confusion and satisfying consumer demand for foods produced
with fewer chemicals.
Germany’s Blue Angel program similarly suggests benefits from
government certification. Created in 1978, Blue Angel is the oldest
environmental certification system in the world. Under the program, the
German environmental agency helps to formulate technical criteria for
certification.
An “environmental label jury” composed of
145. Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 1520.
146. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 206 (suggesting that a purely governmental program would
be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act).
147. Id.; Horne, supra note 108, at 179.
148. OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS, supra note 111, at 36.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 31, 33; Jason J. Czarneski, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon
Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 14-15 (2011).
151. Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1025-26.
152. J. Heckman, A History of Organic Farming: Transitions from Sir Albert Howard’s War
in the Soil to USDA National Organic Program, 21 RENEWABLE AGRICULTURE & FOOD SYSTEMS
143, 148 (2006).
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representatives from industry, consumer and environmental groups,
unions, and other interests approves and applies the criteria. 153 The
environmental minister primarily appoints jury representatives. The jury
is responsible not only for choosing recipients of the certification, but
also for determining the product groups eligible for labeling. 154 The
Blue Angel eco-label is widely recognized in Germany, and consumers
value its independence. 155
None of this is to suggest that government certification systems are
flawless. Wary of certification standards that can be satisfied by only a
few of its members, industry will pressure government-run certification
programs to generate watered-down standards. 156 Industry may come to
dominate the establishment of governmental certification standards, just
as it has come to dominate rulemaking processes. The credibility of
government certification may come into question if the government is
perceived as having close ties to industry. 157 In addition, a wholly
governmental certification system would surely involve significant startup and administrative costs. 158 In contrast to the Energy Star and Water
Sense programs, which focus narrowly on a single, readily testable
product characteristic, a comprehensive environmental certification
program would have to analyze production processes as well as multiple
product characteristics.
Ultimately, these concerns suggest the value of a hybrid approach
that incorporates both the government and the private sector.
Government oversight can provide credibility and ensure that minimum
standards for transparency and accountability are met. At the same time,
leaving the administration of certification programs to independent
private actors can provide insulation against industry pressure, allow
greater flexibility, and reduce administrative costs. 159 The potential
value of having broad stakeholder participation in implementing a
certification program, as in the Blue Angel program, is reflected by a
study finding that consumers trust consumer and environmental

153. The Blue Angel—The Reliable Label, THE BLUE ANGEL: ENV’T LABEL JURY,
http://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blauer_engel/whats_behind_it/the_reliable_label.php (last visited
Sept. 5, 2012).
154. Environmental Label Jury, THE BLUE ANGEL: ENV’T LABEL JURY, http://www.blauerengel.de/en/blauer_engel/who_is_behind_it/environmental_label_jury.php (last visited Sept. 5,
2012).
155. Horne, supra note 108, at 176.
156. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 206.
157. Crespi & Marette, supra note 118, at 100.
158. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 140, at 883.
159. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 208; Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 140, at 883.
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organizations the most to produce a credible eco-label. 160
D.

Proposal: Government Accreditation of Environmental
Certification

Under a hybrid approach, government involvement in
environmental certification systems could take a variety of forms. The
government could step up its policing of green claims, with the EPA
playing a lead role in defining the terms used by green marketers. An
effective policing effort would require the government to expend
substantial resources, however, in testing products and examining supply
chains and production processes. A more prominent yet less demanding
government role might involve regulation of the procedures followed by
certification programs. The government might, for example, mandate
information disclosure or public participation. 161 In light of the
importance of transparency in enabling citizens and third parties to
interpret eco-labels and to monitor the certification process, 162 requiring
transparency in the development and application of standards is
essential. However, because neither this approach nor stepped-up
policing would create a focal standard, the consumer confusion would
likely persist.
Perhaps the most promising means of generating a focal standard
would be to establish a government program that would officially
accredit certification systems already in existence. Although such an
approach might be attacked for favoring a small group of certifiers, it
would require the creation of only minimal new infrastructure. One
precedent for sanctioning existing certification systems involves
Underwriters Laboratories (“UL”), a nonprofit organization engaged in
product safety certification.
Initially funded by the insurance
industry, 163 UL is one of a handful of certifiers that the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) has accredited to provide
the testing and certification required by many of OSHA’s safety
standards. 164 In deciding whether to accredit UL or any other certifier,
OSHA considers a certifier’s independence, ability to perform testing,
control procedures, use of inspections to evaluate products and monitor
160. Renate Gertz, Eco-Labelling-A Case for Deregulation?, 4 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK
127, 136 (2005).
161. Meidinger, Environmental Certification, supra note 124, at 10,175.
162. Meidinger, New Environmental Law, supra note 120, at 285.
163. Grodsky, supra note 114, at 212.
164. Tom Lookabaugh, Patrick Ryan & Douglas C. Sicker, A Model for Emergency Service of
VOIP Through Certification and Labeling, 58 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 115, 127 (2006).
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proper use of the certifier’s mark, and procedures for producing
objective findings and handling complaints. 165 The EPA could consider
similar factors in awarding a government seal to environmental
certifiers. The EPA might also identify relevant environmental criteria
and develop substantive standards that certifiers would be expected to
apply. These standards, on the one hand, could be quite general—for
example, recognizing no more than twenty percent of a market as the top
performers with respect to an environmental criterion. On the other
hand, the standards could be quite specific. For example, they could
require consideration of carbon footprints or preclude certification for
products that use or contain designated highly toxic substances. Such
standards would help ensure that certifications actually promote
sustainability, climate change mitigation, or other desired goals.
Alternatively, the government could set up a new certification
program blending government direction with private implementation.
Such a program might take a form similar to the proposed Eco-Labeling
Act of 2008, which was circulated but never officially endorsed by
Senator Dianne Feinstein. 166 That proposal was patterned in part after
the organic food-labeling program, which requires organic operations to
be certified by third parties accredited by the USDA. 167 Under the
proposed Eco-Labeling Act, the EPA would determine the product
categories generally eligible for green labeling and set up an ecolabeling board whose thirteen members would come from the
government as well as manufacturing, environmental, consumer,
scientific, and labor groups. 168 The board would be responsible for
accrediting independent certification centers, which in turn would set
eco-label criteria for specific product categories, audit production
facilities, and award a federal eco-label to products meeting those
criteria. 169
A new, government-sponsored certification program along these
lines would have the advantage of creating a single label under a single

165. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.7.
166. Eco-Labeling Act of 2008, S., 110th Congress. (2008), available at
http://standards.nsf.org/apps/group_public/download.php/2802/Eco-Label%20bill%207-22-08.pdf.
Gwendolyn Bounds, As Eco-Seals Proliferate, So Do Doubts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123862823846680371.html.
167. 7 C.F.R § Pt. 205.
168. Joe Kamalick, US Eco-Label Mandate on the Table, ICIS CHEMICAL BUSINESS, Oct. 27,
2008, at 13. Eco-Labeling Act §§ 3, 5. Toxic or dangerous products would be ineligible for the
eco-label, as would products manufactured through processes likely to significantly harm human
health or the environment.
169. Eco-Labeling Act §§ 6-9; Kamalick, supra note 168, at 13.
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governance structure. Unlike a purely government-run program, such a
scheme would not require the creation of a substantial bureaucracy to
test and certify products. 170 Although the organic label experience
suggests that such a label could become established fairly rapidly, it is
worth noting that the European Union’s eco-label program, launched in
1992, remains relatively unknown among European consumers despite
substantial publicity. 171 Unless potentially competing labels are cleared
from the field, a completely new government certification may suffer a
similar fate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Establishment of environmental advocates within the EPA would
counter biased rulemaking processes, provide a needed outsider
perspective, and stimulate more vigorous use of existing regulatory
authority. Government sanction of environmental certification systems
would reduce confusion in green marketing and foster more effective
consumer participation in the sustainability movement. These reforms
are important steps toward shifting environmental decision-making
power away from powerful economic interests and to the people, where
it ultimately belongs.
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Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1048.
Gertz, supra note 160, at 137-38; Horne, supra note 108, at 176-78.
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